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Abstract 
 
There is a shortage of nurses in Sweden, especially specialist nurses. The magnitude of the 
problem is expected to increase in the near and distant future due to retiring nurses and an 
expected increase in the demand for health services due to an ageing population in Sweden. In 
this thesis it is examined whether the shortage of specialist nurses can be explained by the 
current economic incentives for general nurses to get specialized. It is done by performing 
econometric analysis on a data material covering all nurses employed by the county council 
located most south in Sweden, Region Skåne. It cannot be proved that economic incentives 
are negative and thus not too low. However, the regressions estimating specialist nurse wage 
premiums are likely to suffer from endogeneity and thus the estimated wage premiums are 
probably upward biased. Therefore it is concluded that the economic incentives might be 
negative even though it cannot be shown in this thesis. Nurses do react to changes in 
economic incentives which make it effective in reducing the shortage. Furthermore it is stated 
that additional factors are influential in a nurse’s decision to get specialized.  
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1. Introduction 
During the most recent years, media in Sweden has reported about an eclipse in the health 
sector. The biggest problems lie within the hospitals and they seem to become larger as time 
goes by. Media reports about a lack of qualified staff, heavily downgraded working 
environment, low wages, increasing queues for patients, temporarily shut downs of hospital 
divisions and not least the increasing mortality due to the tensed situation. These problems 
differ in severity from county to county but it has become a national issue. Why these 
problems occur now is not known until this day. It might be because of the fast technological 
change in the health care sector. Maning et al. (1987) conclude an increasing medical 
expenditure in developed countries driven by technological change. Today, we can simply 
treat more patients than before and as a consequence the costs are increasing. Without 
increasing revenues in the hospital sector, problems occur as a consequence. In addition it is 
stated in most studies concerning health personnel in developed countries that demographic 
changes increase the demand for health care. The elderly become a larger share of the 
population in developed countries.  
 
The focus in this thesis is to highlight the situation where it is severe. There is a shortage of 
nurses in Sweden, especially specialized nurses. Nurses are important as input in a hospital’s 
production function. Barros & Olivella (2011) speak of teams of different types of staff 
working in hospitals. These teams can have different proportions of different kinds of staff, 
but clearly they cannot manage their task without certain types of hospital staff. Both general 
and specialist nurses can thus be seen as a complement in the hospitals production function. 
As technology improves the recruitment for specialist nurses is of particular importance. It 
make the questions of how attract nurses and to make them specialize important for policy 
makers. 
 
1.1 Aim of the thesis 
 
Can wages explain the shortage of specialist nurses in the Swedish health sector? The aim of 
this thesis is to provide an answer to that question. Hence, the economic incentives to become 
a specialist nurse are examined. They can be examined in several ways. In this thesis the aim 
is to examine the economic incentives to become a specialist nurse given that the person 
already is a nurse. It is done by examining if it breaks even economically for a nurse to 
specialize and if so, how long it takes for the specialization to do so.  
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It is also likely that other factors than economic incentives could have influence in the 
decision to get specialized. Thus nurses’ behavior will be examined in able to tell how 
important economic incentives and other factors are to nurses. It implies presenting theory 
about nurses’ and their employers’ behavior. It also implies presenting the existing nurse 
literature and to apply it in a setting in Sweden and Skåne. 
 
In the empirical analysis, the wage premiums for specialist nurses are compared to non-
specialist nurses by econometric methods for those employed by the county council Region 
Skåne. The specialist nurses examined are those within ambulance, anesthesia, operation, 
district nursing, intensive care, psychiatry, children and midwives. There is an additional 
group labeled as other specialists, which are all other specialist nurses employed by Region 
Skåne. Since the sample only includes individuals employed by Region Skåne it is the wage 
premiums in secondary and primary care that are examined. Those employed by private actors 
and municipalities in Skåne are not included. It is hypothesized that the economic incentives 
for nurses to specialize are too low. The wage premium of getting specialized is hypothesized 
to be positive, but not large enough to cover the costs of the education. If incentives were not 
too low, there would probably not be a shortage.  
2. Explaining the shortage of nurses in the Swedish health sector 
2.1 Theoretical framework of nurses labor market 
 
Shortage of nurses is not a typical Swedish problem. Several authors state that it is a problem 
for almost all developed countries, Rice (2005), Askildsen et al. (2002) and Di Tommaso et 
al. (2007) being some of them. Since it is such a common problem there must be some 
mechanism in an economy that makes this problem occur. Some argue that low wages for 
nurses are due to female discrimination, but the most common explanation for this 
phenomenon to occur is the theory of monopsony power. Hirsch & Schumacher (1995 and 
2008), Sullivan (1989), Link & Landon (1975) and Calmfors & Rickardsson (2004) explain 
the concepts of this theory, among many others. According to Sullivan (1989), the nurse 
situation in most developed countries is a school book example of this theory. The theory of 
monopsony power is presented as an explanation for today’s situation in the Swedish health 
sector but is not tested in the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
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The basic concept is described in Figure 1. Monopsony (or oligopsony) power implies, unlike 
a competitive labor market, a market with only one (or a few) employer(s) often because the 
labor force is specialized to a high degree and/or geographically isolated. Hence there is 
limited labor mobility among the employees, nurses in this case. The employer in this case is 
some actor in the health sector, often a hospital. The employer face an upward sloping labor 
supply curve of the nurses, i.e. the higher wage the more labor supplied. It has a downward 
sloping demand curve, implying that it would like to hire more nurses as the wage level 
decreases. So far it looks as a competitive labor market with a wage level at W* and the hired 
amount of nurses at L*. 
 
 
 
In the case of monopsony power the employer faces a higher marginal labor cost, MLC, than 
the supply curve. In order for the hospital to maximize its profits it would like MLC to be 
equal to its marginal revenue product, MRP, where MLC intersects the demand curve. Thus 
the nurses hired go down to Lm. At the quantity of Lm the employer only pay a wage level of 
Wm. As a result it gets a shortage of nurses and nurses face a low wage level. At the wage Wm 
the employer demands Ld nurses, but only Lm nurses are supplied. The employer would like to 
hire more nurses but only at the wage level of Wm. If it raises the wage level it has to do so for 
all nurses and thus it will not raise the wage level. In a competitive labor market, nurses 
would face a higher wage level and hospitals would hire more nurses.  
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For most of the actors in the Swedish health sector maximizing profits is not the goal of the 
agency since it is often run by local governments. Calmfors & Rickardsson (2004) argue that 
the goal of these agencies is rather to minimize the costs or to get as much health care as 
possible for a given budget. These goals should be equally strong as the goals of maximizing 
profits for a profit maximizing agency and the local governments aim for their goals by using 
monopsony power in the same way as a profit maximizer. Furthermore Hirsch & Schumacher 
(1995) states that in order to reduce the nurse shortage, it may be the case that hospitals wage 
discriminate as much as possible. If hospitals only pay the reservation wage of each nurse, 
labor supply increases while wage costs are kept constant. Hence for a given level of 
productivity, larger wage differences between employees should be observed in hospitals than 
in the competitive labor market. Theory also predicts a flatter wage development over time 
when monopsony power is present. Since nurses will not get compensated for their future 
increase in productivity, entry-level nurses demand higher wage as a consequence. The last 
paragraph is interesting from a Swedish perspective. It is what is observed in the Swedish 
health sector, not least at the hospitals. Nurse students and nurses who have recently 
graduated have started to demonstrate all over the country for improved entry wages. 
 
Hirsch & Schumacher (1995 and 2008) state that the empirical evidence for monopsony 
power among hospitals is mixed. Since many of the papers about monopsony power and 
nurses are from different countries it is not very surprising. The settings in different countries’ 
health sector usually differ. Thus the magnitude of monopsony power is likely to vary 
between countries too. The majority of empirical studies are made in USA, which is probably 
one of the countries in the world with the least monopsony power in the health sector. On the 
other hand, the health sector in Sweden is very likely to be monopsonistic. Especially since 
there is only a single provider of secondary care in each market, namely the county council of 
concern. Swedish hospitals do not compete with each other like in USA. Thus the usual way 
of testing for monopsony power by observing the hospital concentration and wages in 
different areas is not appropriate in the Swedish case. Calmfors & Rickardsson (2004) argue 
that another problem with testing for monopsony power in that way is that areas with a higher 
concentration of hospitals are urban areas. These areas often have a higher price and wage 
level in general and thus higher wages in urban areas might not be a proof of less monopsony 
power but rather reflected in a higher price level in general.  
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Askildsen et al. (2002) conclude that the market for health personnel is monopsonistic in the 
UK and the Scandinavian countries and that these countries suffer from a nurse shortage. 
However, the fact that the county councils own the hospital market in Sweden does not mean 
that there is complete monopsony power in the overall labor market for nurses. It stretches 
beyond the hospitals. The question is to which degree is the Swedish labor market for nurses 
monopsonistic? When looking only at the hospital labor market for nurses it is likely that 
there is a high degree of monopsony power. When looking at the whole labor market for 
nurses, the degree of monopsony is probably smaller. There are indications that nurses’ 
employers other than the county councils often pay better and the working conditions are 
better in general. They compete with the county councils in attracting nurses and thus they 
probably decrease the overall degree of monopsony in nurses’ labor market. There are also 
indications that the country councils have started to compete with each other to some degree. 
Increasing entry level wage differences between county councils is one such indicator. Other 
competitors are Norway and Denmark. There is a large difference between Norwegian and 
Swedish nurse wages. The Norwegian wage is the higher of them but one must not forget that  
there is a higher general price level in Norway too. One reason of the rapidly increasing 
dissatisfaction of Swedish nurses might be that the degree of monopsony has decreased in 
Sweden. Hospitals might not have noticed it and thus have not yet adapted to the new nurse  
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labor market. Most specialist nurses only have a county council as potential employer. Thus 
they are probably more exposed to a monopsonistic labor market than general nurses. They 
are less mobile.  
 
A situation with decreasing monopsony power takes the theoretical form shown in Figure 2. 
Monopsony power becomes oligopsony power by tilting the MLC curve closer to the supply 
curve. Wages get closer to the equilibrium level and the shortage should be reduced with an 
employment level closer to equilibrium. 
 
2.2 The nurse situation in Sweden  
 
To become a nurse in Sweden you have to study for three years at the university level, which 
leads to a bachelor degree in medicine with a specialization in nursing. To become a specialist 
nurse you have to study additional one to one and a half years depending on your 
specialization. The prerequisite for becoming a specialist nurse differs between universities. 
In all universities the nurse at least need its bachelor degree. In addition one year of 
experience as a nurse is needed for all specialist nurse educations except the one within 
children at Lund University. The specializations are within ambulance, oncology, surgery, 
anesthesia, operation, district nursing, medicine, intensive care, psychiatry, geriatric care and 
children. Midwife is also a further education for nurses. Working as a company nurse is 
another possibility for nurses. It also demands additional education beyond the bachelor 
degree. There are also radiographic nurses, but their education differs from the general nurse 
education. It is of the same length but a radiographic nurse’s bachelor degree differs from a 
general nurse’s.  
 
The lengths of all specialist nurse educations covered in the data are described in Table 1 
below. A specialist nurse education is usually unpaid, unlike a doctor’s specialization. Like all 
studies at the university level the education is free, but students usually have to take a loan 
from the Swedish National Board of Student Aid (called CSN in Sweden) in able to make a 
living. It is argued to be the most likely way to finance a specialist nurse education. However, 
there are other possibilities of financing the education. In some cases nurses get paid by its 
county council for getting specialized. It is not very common though. A nurse could also 
choose to work parallel to the studies. In that case the nurse reduces its amount of leisure 
which is argued in this thesis to cause disutility. To become a nurse assistant you need a high 
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Table 1: Length of Different Specialist Nurse Educations 
 ECTS-credits Semesters Needed work experience in Lund (years) 
Ambulance 60 2 1 
Anesthesia 60 2 1 
Children 60 2 0 
Midwife 90 3 1 
District 75 2.5 1 
Intensive care 60 2 1 
Operation 60 2 1 
Prychiatry 60 2 1 
          Source: Lund University 
 
school education. To become a doctor you need to study five and a half years at the university 
level. In order to get the license you need additional one and a half years of education which 
you get paid for. A doctor must specialize and that demands around additional five years 
which they also get paid for. The latter two educations are included in their job.  
 
In Sweden, health care by a hospital is provided by the county council you live in. It is 
provided to all citizens and the patients have to pay small out-of-pocket fees. Some hospitals 
are owned privately, but they are very rare. They get their revenues from the county council 
and must offer health care just like the county council owned hospitals. Nurses not only work 
on a hospital. They also work with primary care on health centers. Health centers are financed 
in the same way as hospitals, but the private owners are more frequent than in the hospital 
sector. A nurse can also work for a municipality. The municipalities are responsible for the 
geriatric care. Private actors also provide a share of the geriatric care. Some nurses work for 
companies as a company nurse. Many Swedish nurses also choose to work in Norway (and to 
some extent Denmark) due to higher wages and better working conditions. Di Tommaso et al. 
(2007) state that a large share of the nurses in Norway come from other countries, especially 
from Sweden. 
 
Statistics Sweden (2013) concludes that there is an overall shortage of nurses in Sweden, 
especially experienced and specialist nurses. In their forecast they conclude that it is likely to 
be an increased magnitude of this problem in the near and distant future. The Swedish 
National Board of Health and Welfare (2014) and the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (2014) come to the same conclusions. According to the two latter 
reports, the increasing magnitude of the problem is because of an ageing labor force and 
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expected future increased demand for health care due to demographic changes in the Swedish 
population. In all three reports it is stated that there are some regional differences but there is 
a shortage in all county councils. According to the Swedish National Board of Health and 
Welfare (2014) the number of specialist nurses has decreased by 19% in the period 1995-
2011. To some extent it is due to changes in the education systems. During the same period 
the median age of specialist nurses has gone from 46 to 54 years old and those above 65 years 
old have gone from 3% of the labor force to 12%. The specialist nurse shortage is most severe 
within psychiatry, anesthesia, operation, intensive care and geriatric care. In southern Sweden, 
the number of specialist nurses adjusted to the population is close to national average.  
 
Furthermore they state the economic incentives for nurses to get specialized are low. Even if 
powerful actions are taken today, it will take several years for the increased amount of 
specialist nurses to be larger than the number of those retiring or leaving the health sector.  
In Graph 1 the average monthly wages for staff in the Swedish hospital sector are presented. 
The graph should be interpreted with caution since it does not say anything about 
characteristics like differences in age and gender composition, which should affect the wage  
 
Graph 1 
 
 Source: Statistics Sweden 
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level. However, it gets the reader and indication about the nurse wage situation. The 
difference between a nurse and a nurse assistant is less than 4000 Swedish Crowns (SEK) in 
2012. The difference between a nurse and a specialist nurse is a bit lower. A much larger 
difference is the one between different nurses and an average doctor. Not only is the 
difference high in 2005, it is also increasing over time in absolute values. An average doctor 
has more than twice the wage of an average general nurse in 2012. The difference between a 
specialist nurse and an average doctor is a little less.  
 
There are regional wage differences between nurses according to Vårdfokus (2014). The 
offered hospital entry-level monthly wage before tax for general nurses in university hospitals 
is 22.000 SEK in Skåne, 22.300 SEK in Stockholm, 22.500 SEK in Gothenburg, 22.700 SEK 
in Linköping, 23.500 SEK in Örebro, 23.600-24.000 SEK in Umeå and 24.000-25.500 SEK in 
Uppsala. It is only in Stockholm and Uppsala that it is possible to negotiate up to 25.000 SEK. 
Most of the hospitals with the higher offered wage level used to offer a much lower entry-
level wage but has recently increased it. It is an indication that the competition for attracting 
nurses seem to increase between county councils. In addition Radio Sweden (2013) reports 
that many nurses in Skåne choose to work for a municipality instead of the hospitals, 
indicating that each county council seem to get additional competition from municipalities. In 
many cases an average municipality pays thousands of SEK more per month and the working 
environment is better than at a hospital. It is stated by the Swedish Association of Health 
Professionals (2014) for other parts of the country too.  
 
2.3 Theory for explaining nurses’ behavior 
 
Both Phillips (1995) and Kankaanrata & Rissanen (2009) develop reasonable neoclassical 
models for explaining nurses’ labor supply. In their models there are two decisions of a nurse. 
At first the individual chooses to participate in the labor force or not. It could be both 
individuals educated as a nurse and individuals considering becoming a nurse. The decision is 
pure economical. A nurse will participate in the labor force if the offered market wage is at 
least as high as his or her reservation wage. The market wage is determined by the 
employer(s) and the reservation wage is determined by individual characteristics and non-
labor income. If the market wage is below a nurse’s reservation wage he or she will offer zero 
hours of labor supply. In the opposite case, a nurse will take the decision of how many hours 
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of labor to supply. That decision depends on individual characteristics, the non-labor income, 
working conditions and working environment. 
 
These models could be used for explaining nurses’ further educational decisions too by letting 
the market wage be the expected net gain in lifetime income by specializing and compare it to 
reservation net gain in by specializing. It would be a pure economic decision. The economic 
incentives for a general nurse to become a specialist nurse are examined in this thesis but on 
the other hand it is argued that the decision of getting further educated does not depend on 
economic incentives alone. As shown in the nurse literature, there are additional important 
factors in a nurse’s overall satisfaction. Thus a nurse might take other factors into account in 
its educational decision if it is the case that other factors than the economic do change when a 
nurse gets specialized. Hence, using the models developed by Phillips (1995) and 
Kankaanrata & Rissanen (2009) is not appropriate for explaining a nurse’s further educational 
decision. 
 
2.3.1 Explaining nurses’ educational decision 
 
Instead of applying the above mentioned models for explaining a nurse’s decision to get 
specialized, it is argued that if the net utility of getting specialized is positive the nurse will 
specialize. The net utility is the difference between an individual’s utility as a specialist nurse 
and as a general nurse. The inequality is described in Equation 1 where Ui
S
 is the individual’s 
utility as a specialist nurse and Ui
G
 is the individual’s utility by keep working as a general 
nurse. 
 
  
    
                        
 
A nurse’s utility function could be explained as in Equation 2, irrespective of being a general 
or a specialist nurse.  
 
                            |                 
 
In Equation 2, Yi is a nurse’s household income including the nurse wage, li is leisure, Si is 
skill level, Ii is the level of influence at the workplace, WLi is workload, WCi is other working 
conditions like contractual arrangements and environmental factors and Ei is effort. In this 
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case effort could be the mental cost of go back to school. In the utility function a nurse gets 
different levels of utility for different values of these parameters given his or her individual 
characteristics, ICi. Individual characteristics are variables like age, sex, marital status, 
ethnicity, number of children and ability. It is reasonable to assume that for example a given 
level of leisure will result in different levels of utilities for a nurse with children and a nurse 
without children. Furthermore it is assumed that the variables Yi, li, Si and Ii are positively 
related to utility for all nurses. The variables WLi and Ei are assumed to be negatively related 
to all nurses’ utilities. The variable WCi corresponds to different levels of utility depending on 
the contractual arrangements and working environment of the nurse’s workplace. All 
variables are assumed to have a decreasing marginal effect. The assumptions of the utility 
function in Equation 2 will be even clearer to the reader in the next section,  
3. Previous Research. 
 
The interesting question is when Equation 1 is true, i.e. when the utility of becoming a 
specialist nurse is higher than the utility of keep working as a general nurse. In order to get an 
answer to the question one must first conclude which variables are affected by the decision to 
get specialized. The lifetime household income will change. If the change in lifetime income 
is positive or negative is examined in the empirical analysis of this thesis. Since a nurse 
acquires greater skills by specializing the difference will result in a higher level of utility. A 
nurse’s influence on the workplace will probably increase as a consequence of the 
specialization and will therefore have a positive effect on utility. An amount of effort is 
needed to get specialized and therefore there will also be a negative effect of utility by getting 
specialized. The other variables are assumed to be unaffected by the decision of specializing. 
Thus, for a nurse to get further educated the inequality in Equation 3 must be fulfilled. The 
only variable with unknown effect on the level of utility is the change in lifetime income. If 
the difference in income is negative, the wage premium for specialist nurses is too low and 
will have a negative effect on utility. It will cause fewer nurses to get specialized, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
In this thesis, economic incentives are argued to be an important factor for nurses. However, 
the inequality in Equation 3 might be fulfilled for some individuals even though there are 
negative incentives. On the other hand, if it is the case that incentives are positive, Equation 3 
might still not be fulfilled for some individuals. Higher economic incentives and/or 
improvements in other variables are needed for some nurses to specialize. For example nurses 
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with a higher level of ability will probably get a quite low disutility of the effort demanded by 
the further education than a nurse with a lower level of ability. In addition the high ability 
nurse will probably have higher marginal effect on utility by the change in skill and influence 
too. Thus the nurse with high ability need lower economic incentives, ceteris paribus. 
 
                                |                  
 
where, 
 
      
    
        
    
        
    
        
    
  
3. Previous Research 
 
As far as I know there is no existing research concerning specialist nurse wages or Swedish 
nurses alone in an economic focus. However there are a number of valuable research areas for 
the purpose of this thesis. 
3.1 Nurses’ response to wage changes 
 
It is not only important to determine what nurses’ economic incentives are. In able to reduce 
problems of nurse and specialist nurse shortages it must also be discussed how nurses react to 
changes in economic incentives like wage changes. Several studies from several countries 
have been made about nurses’ wage elasticity. Some of them are Rice (2005) who estimates 
the nurse wage elasticity in UK, Askildsen et al. (2002) and Di Tommaso et al. (2007) 
estimate it with Norwegian data. They all state that it is a well-studied area and that most of 
the researchers come to similar conclusions even though they are applied in different 
countries. Almost all research focus on the nurse wage elasticity of the existing labor force. 
Thus it is the short term wage elasticity that is examined and it is true that it is a well- 
researched area. However, it is argued in this thesis that the dynamic long-run effects of 
economic incentives are of at least equal importance to reduce the shortage in Sweden and 
other countries. It implies the possibility of attracting more individuals both to the profession 
of nursing and for nurses to get specialized by an expected higher wage level. In addition a 
higher wage level will probably retain the existing labor force to a larger extent too. 
Kankaanrata & Rissanen (2007) confirms this statement, at least for the Finnish health sector. 
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3.2 Short term and long-run effects 
 
By excluding the long-run effects, researches focus on how part time nurses’ labor supply (in 
hours) changes due to wage changes. Most of the studies, including the three above, estimate 
a wage elasticity around 0.2-0.4. They conclude that nurses do react to wage changes but it 
would be very costly to attract nurses just by increasing wages. However, looking at the 
Swedish case it is very likely that potential future nurses might choose not to become a nurse 
when media recurrently reports about low wages and bad working conditions. This fact must 
also be taken into account. In addition it is less likely for nurses to get specialized if there is 
not a high expected wage increase of the decision. Additional factors make it extra important 
to include the long-run wage elasticity in Sweden. If wages are low there is an imminent risk 
of losing both general and specialist nurses to neighbor countries, especially to Norway. 
Region Skåne also competes with Denmark because of its geographical location. In addition 
an average nurse employed by Region Skåne works 95.9% of full time and hence there is not 
much space for short term effects either.  
 
The arguments about including the long-run effects on labor supply by wage changes is 
confirmed by Phillips (1995), Kankanraata & Rissanen (2007 and 2009) and Hanel et al. 
(2012).  Phillips (1995) examines the labor supply of nurses in UK. He concludes that labor 
participation, i.e. attracting more people to join the nurse labor force, is highly responsive to 
wage changes. The elasticity of probability of participation with respect to wages is estimated 
to 1.4, meaning that a 10% increase in wages lead to a 14% higher probability of labor 
participating. Furthermore he points out the importance of examining long-run effects because 
of the future expected increase in demand for health care in developed countries. Hanel et al. 
(2012) start by estimating the short term wage elasticity and come to similar results as 
previous studies. They continue by also including the long run wage elasticity and then state 
an overall wage elasticity of 1.3.  
 
Both Phillips (1995) and Kankaanrata & Rissanen (2009) develop models that aim to explain 
the nurse labor supply. They argue that a nurse will only participate in the labor force if the 
market wage is above his or her reservation wage. That is a decision of pure substitution 
effect. In this case it could be a general nurse, specialist nurse or even a potential future nurse. 
Once the decision to participate is made, the next decision is how many hours he or she is 
willing to work given the nurse’s individual characteristics. The latter decision is a 
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combination of income and substitution effect, where the substitution effect seems to 
dominate according to previous studies about the short term nurse wage elasticity. In 
conclusion, when taking both short term and long-run effects into account, increasing wages 
seem to be an effective tool of reducing the nurse shortage. Thus it is probably the case that 
higher economic incentives for general nurses to get further educated will make more of them 
to do so. 
 
3.3 Wage and productivity 
 
There are additional positive effects of raising nurse wages. It will probably make nurses 
more productive. The existing labor force might feel more appreciated and thus raise their 
loyalty and productivity. In addition more productive individuals might be attracted to the 
profession. Economic theory suggests that a higher wage level leads to raised productivity. 
Hall et al. (2008) confirm this relationship. They examine how hospital productivity is 
affected by wages outside the health sector in different areas of the UK. Wages for health 
personnel are centralized to a high degree in the UK and thus very equal all over the country. 
However, the presence of labor markets with higher offered wages outside the health sector 
differ very much around the country. By comparing the productivity in hospitals between 
regions with differences in competing labor markets for potential health personnel, they 
conclude that productivity is lower when the outside wage is higher. Thus when wages in the 
health sector are on a significant lower level than the local labor market outside the health 
sector, hospitals find it hard to attract productive personnel and to retain its existing stock of 
personnel. Hall et al. (2008) state that a 10% increase in outside wages on average increase 
mortality by 4%-8% for acute myocardial infarction patients. Since nurse wages in Sweden 
are considered very low, these results might be applicable to a Swedish setting as well.  
 
3.4 Non-economic factors 
 
In addition to the above mentioned conclusions, Phillips (1995) and Kankaanrata & Rissanen 
(2007 and 2009) come to the conclusion that it is probably not enough to focus only on 
nurses’ wages. Working conditions and career possibilities might be important factors as well 
for an increased participation rate, to retain personnel and to raise the labor supply of the 
existing labor force. It is concluded by Kankaanrata & Rissanen (2007) that there is a 
significant lowered risk for a Finnish nurse to leave the health sector if there is a possibility of 
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getting specialized. In the studies by Askildsen et al. (2002), Di Tommaso et al. (2007) and 
Rice (2005) it is also concluded that tougher working conditions make nurses less responsive 
to wage changes. Working shift is often the most significant factor. Personal characteristics 
also matter, like being married, having children and the nurse’s household disposable income.  
 
There are researchers who choose to focus on other factors influencing the nurse labor supply 
than economic incentives. Most of them focus on how to retain the existing labor force. 
Heinen et al. (2012) examine what factors make nurses leave the health sector. The study is 
empirical and made on 10 European countries. They conclude that the working environment 
is very important in a nurse’s decision not to leave the health sector. However, there are 
differences between countries in which parts of the working environment that are significant 
in a nurse’s decision. Thus it is important to account for country specific factors. The most 
important variable for a nurse’s decision in the overall sample is experience from burnout and 
28% of the nurses have had such an experience. Other influential factors are satisfaction with 
the leadership, nurse-physician relationship and lack of participation in hospital affairs. The 
nurses most likely to leave the health sector are men, older nurses and those working part 
time. Aiken et al. (2012) perform a similar study for 12 European countries. Sweden, Norway 
and Finland are included and Sweden stands for a large fraction of the sample. In the overall 
sample, 11%-56% of the nurses are dissatisfied with their situation. In Sweden that share is 
20%. The dissatisfaction concerns wages, educational possibilities and possibilities of 
advancement. More than half of the overall sample is dissatisfied with the possibilities of 
advancement. In Sweden more than half of the nurses rate their working environment as poor 
or only fair against the alternatives good or excellent. It is also stated that a large fraction of 
the nurses intend to leave the profession.  
 
The conclusion by Aiken et al. (2012) is that a shortage of nurses is to be expected when a 
country improves economically unless the hospital working environment does not improve. 
They argue that improving the working conditions could be done at relatively low costs. 
There should be better possibilities for nurses’ development by clear career ladders. 
Furthermore there are additional effects of improving nurses working conditions. It is shown 
by Alenius et al. (2013) that improving working conditions is strongly related to a nurse’s 
assessment for patient safety.  
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4. Data and method 
4.1 Describing the data material 
 
The data covers nurses employed by Region Skåne. It is the county council located most 
south in Sweden of the 21 county councils in Sweden and is Skåne’s biggest employer. Its 
responsibilities are to provide both primary and secondary care for the citizens against small 
out-of-pocket fees. To provide psychiatric care is also a task for the county council. However, 
pure geriatric care is not one of the county councils responsibilities. According to Statistics 
Sweden, Sweden has a population of 9 658 301 citizens of which 1 274 069 live in Skåne in 
2013. It corresponds to 13.19% of the population. One of the biggest hospitals in Sweden is 
run by Region Skåne. It is the Skåne University Hospital and is located both in Malmö and 
Lund. 
 
The data is a cross-section set on individual level that covers all nurses and specialist nurses 
employed by Region Skåne in March 2014. There were 9 658 nurses and specialist nurses 
employed. Nurses stand for almost a third of the labor force in the health service provided by 
Region Skåne. Not all of the nurses got paid in March for unknown reasons. Many of those 
are probably summer interns who have not started to work yet. There were 514 individuals 
who did not get paid in March and thus they were excluded from the sample in order to not 
bias the results. Additional 343 nurses were excluded. Those were radiographic nurses and are 
considered to be too different from other nurses and do not have the same specialization 
possibilities as a general nurse. Those exclusions shortened the sample to 8 801 observations. 
 
The variables in the data set are monthly wage in SEK before tax, dummy variables for each 
type of nurse, age in years, sex, type of employment and variable for how much a nurse works 
in quantity as a share of full time employment. The wage variable is without any additions 
and expressed as if the nurse is working full time even if he or she works part time. The 
dummy variables for each type of nurse take the value of one if it is true for that type of nurse 
and zero otherwise. The nurse specializations included in the sample and having dummy 
variables are specialists within ambulance, anesthesia, operation, district nursing, intensive 
care, psychiatry, children’s health and midwives. Specialists in oncology, medicine and 
surgery are also included in the sample but they are all labeled as other nurse specialist. 
Included in the same category are also further educated nurses in smaller areas. It could be 
nurses specialized within eyes, ultra-sound and pain relief. Hence, all specialties not 
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mentioned above are compounded into one single dummy variable. The general nurse is 
considered as the baseline. The sex variable is a dummy variable taking the value of one if it 
is a female nurse and the value of zero if it is a male nurse. The variable for type of 
employment is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the nurse is permanently 
employed and zero if he or she is only employed for a limited period of time. How much the 
nurse works in quantity is measured as a value between zero and one, where one means full 
time employment and every number lower than one is the share of full time employment.  
 
The average age is 44.19 years (median of 44 years) and the average monthly wage is           
28 667.27 SEK (median of 29 000 SEK) in the sample. There are 4 347 specialist nurses and 
they stand for a share of 49.39%. The number of women are 7 953 which corresponds to 
90.36% of the sample. 7 810 nurses are permanently employed which corresponds to 88.74%. 
The average amount of work as a share of full time employment is 95.90%, meaning that a 
surprisingly large fraction of the sample has a full time employment. Statistics for each sub 
sample is presented in Table 2 below. There are no large wage differences between different 
kinds specialist nurses with the exception of those specialized in ambulance. Their mean and 
median wage is below 29 000 SEK per month before tax.  All other specialist nurses lie in the 
interval 30 000-31 900 SEK. The largest group of further educated nurses is midwives. They 
stand for 6.74% of the sample. Specialist nurses within ambulance are the only group with an 
average age below 40 years. All other groups of specialist nurses have an average age above 
45. The two oldest groups are specialists within psychiatry and district nursing. These groups 
each have an average age above 50 years. The high average age for many groups of specialist 
nurses is an indication of the need of better recruitment of specialist nurses. 
 
The wage distribution of the whole sample, i.e. both for general and specialist nurses, is 
presented in Graph 2. It is shown in the graph that almost every fourth nurse earns less than 
25 000 SEK per month  before tax,  95% of them earn less than 35 000 SEK and about 60% 
earn less than 30 000 SEK. Approximately half of the sample has a university education of 
three years while the other half has a university education of at least four years. In comparison 
to other professions with an equal amount of education in Sweden, the nurse wages are 
considered very low. In other words there is a high opportunity cost of becoming a nurse or 
specialist nurse.  
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Table 2: Statistics for each sub sample 
 
 
  Mean wage (SEK) Median wage (SEK) Mean age (years) Median age (years) No. of individuals Fraction of sample (%) 
General Nurse 26115 25600 39.51 37 4 454 50.61 
All Specialist Nurses 31282 31100 49.00 49 4347 49.39 
Children 30719 30450 46.71 46 409 4.65 
Operation 31294 31263 46.90 47,5 348 3.95 
Intensive Care 31595 31560 47.53 48 456 5.18 
Ambulance 28864 28848 39.13 39 103 1.17 
Psychiatry 30451 30225 51.34 52,5 358 4.07 
District 31288 31000 50.30 51 449 5.10 
Anesthesia 31831 31800 47.60 46 427 4.85 
Midwife 31644 31550 48.27 48 593 6.74 
Other Specialist Nurse 31431 31200 51.43 52 1204 13.68 
Total 28 667 29000 44.19 44 8801 100.00 
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Graph 2 
 
 Source: Region Skåne 
 
4.2 The model 
 
In order to estimate the wage premium for different specialist nurses, the model in Equation 4 
is estimated.  
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In Equation 4 all of the above mentioned variables are included.  The variable Wi is the wage, 
α is an intercept term, Sexi is the dummy variable for being a woman, Agei is the age, 
Employmenti is the dummy variable for being permanently employed, WorkQi is the variable 
for quantity of work in terms of share of full time work, Si is a vector of dummy variables for 
each nurse specialist previously described with a corresponding vector of coefficients, γ, and 
εi is the error term.  
 
In the model β1 is hypothesized to be negative since men often earn more than women in 
general. The coefficient β2 is expected to be positive because people often get more 
productive when they are older and thus they get better paid. Age can also be seen as a good 
proxy for work experience, which also use to be positively related to productivity and thus 
also to the wage level. On the other hand this relationship is probably concave, meaning there 
is a decreasing marginal effect of age on the wage level. Hence, β3 is expected to be negative. 
Being permanently employed should give better opportunities for an employee to negotiate 
about his or her wage. Therefore β4 is expected to be positive. However it seems to be hard to 
negotiate about the wage at all for nurses in the Swedish health sector and therefore it is 
expected to be small in its magnitude. The measurement for quantity of work might be an 
indicator of effort, which is probably reflected in a nurse’s productivity in other tasks. It might 
also be the case that those nurses working part time live in a household where the disposable 
income is already high excluding the nurse’s wage. Therefore they are in less need of a wage 
increase and will not negotiate as hard as other nurses. Both of these hypotheses make β5 to be 
expected with a positive sign. When it comes to the γ-values they are all expected to be 
positive. It is shown in both Graph 1 and Table 2 that the average wage level of any specialist 
nurse is higher than the average wage level of a general nurse. Simple economic theory also 
predicts that there must be economic incentives for people to get educated and an employer 
should be willing to pay more for better educated personnel. The question is if the γ-values 
are large enough for the specialization to break even economically. 
 
The variables of main interest for the purpose of this thesis are the γ-values, i.e. the nurse 
specialist wage premiums. Therefore it is relevant to discuss the reliability and interpretations 
of these coefficients. There is a risk for those coefficients to suffer from endogeneity due to 
omitted variables. If that is the case, the coefficients get biased. A likely omitted variable that 
might bias the results is a measurement for ability. In this case it is reasonable to assume that 
nurses who choose to get specialized probably have higher ability than those who do not 
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choose to do so. Individuals with higher ability can in this case be individuals that are more 
intelligent, have greater effort and/or are more motivated. Hence, because of higher ability on 
average, individuals who choose to get specialized would probably get better paid than other 
general nurses even if they had chosen not to specialize. Unfortunately there is no 
measurement for ability in the data used in this thesis. Such a measurement could be cognitive 
tests from tryouts to the Swedish military or high school grades. Unfortunately the cognitive 
tests are mostly performed by men and most nurses are women. High school grades are 
probably a good indicator of intelligence. It is not perfect because teachers probably do not 
give grades in exactly the same way, some high school programs might be tougher than others 
and school grades are not only a function of intelligence but also effort. On the other hand, 
effort could be count as a part of a person’s ability too and thus high school grades might be a 
good measurement for ability.  
 
If it is the case that the model suffers from endogeneity, the γ-values are biased and cannot be 
interpreted as the causal wage effect of becoming a specific nurse specialist. However, it is 
argued in this thesis that the results of such a model are valuable even though the model might 
suffer from endogeneity. Following the arguments by Angrist & Pischke (2009) and 
Lundborg (2008) the error term in Equation 4, εi, takes the form of Equation 5 if the model 
suffer from the above described problem.  
 
                                   
 
In Equation 5, the variable Ai is the measurement for ability and vi is a white noise error term. 
If there is no measurement for Ai it will be reflected in the error term as an unobserved 
omitted variable and εi will not be a white noise error term. Instead the dummy variables for 
being a certain type of specialist will be correlated with the error term, Cov(Si,εi) 0. 
Following the arguments by Angrist & Pischke (2009) and Lundborg (2008) again, the 
expression for the OLS estimator of γn takes the form of Equation 6 for all ns. It is then 
assumed that Cov(γn,vi)=0 and Cov(γn,α)=0 for all ns and that there are no problems with 
multicolinearity.  
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It is shown in Equation 6 that the OLS estimator of γn for all ns is the true value of γn plus a 
bias term. However, it is argued that the results are of value even though such a regression 
suffers from the problem with endogeneity. The reason is the assumption that Cov(Si,Ai) for 
all specializations are positive, implying that the γ-values are all upward biased. The aim of 
this thesis is to find out if it ever breaks even economically for a nurse to get specialized, i.e. 
if the wage premium minus the costs is positive or negative. Then if it shown that it never 
breaks even economically, one can with certainty still say that it is the case. Because if the 
true γ-values are estimated instead, the results would be even worse with the same student 
loan and the same loss in income due to absence from work but with a lower wage increase by 
getting specialized. If it is shown that it does break even for a nurse to specialize and how 
long it would take for it to do so, then one could say that it at best breaks even after that 
certain period of time. Due to the upward biasedness of the wage premium it is likely to take 
longer for the investment to break even than shown in the results. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Regression analysis 
 
The results from the regressions are presented in Table 3
1
. The standard errors are presented 
below all coefficients. The model described above is the regression named S2. All other 
regressions are modification of that model in able for the reader to see the difference between 
models. In all models, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are surprisingly high for being individual level 
data. The first two regressions, F1 and F2, are models with a dummy variable taking the value 
of one if the nurse is further educated and zero otherwise. In those regressions all specialist 
nurses are labeled the same. In F1 there is only one age variable. In addition the squared age 
variable is included in F2. It is the only difference between the two models. The main 
conclusions from these models are that age is positively correlated with a nurse’s wage level. 
However, there is a decreasing marginal effect of age which is reflected in the negative 
coefficient for the squared age variable. In addition the model is improved by adding the 
squared age variable both by lowering Aikake’s information criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC). Both the R
2
 and the adjusted R
2
 get improved too. In  
                                               
1 In all models both the Breusch-Pagan test and White’s test indicate heteroskedastic residuals. The problem is 
dealt with by using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent robust estimator in all regressions presented in Table 3. 
The residuals of S2 are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Regressions 
 
 F1 F2 S1 S2 log1 log2 
αi 16729,85*** 10622,91*** 16536,86*** 10698,44*** 9,8281*** 9,5652*** 
 319,59 422,47 312,67 409,39 0,0104 0,0137 
Agei 187,54*** 499,35*** 190,64*** 489,40*** 0,0067*** 0,0200*** 
 2,49 16,89 2,48 16,57 0,0001 0,0006 
Agei
2
   -3,47***   -3,33***   -0,0002*** 
  0,19  0,19  0,0000 
Sexi 45,42 19,12 -64,15 -92,30 -0,0012 -0,0024 
 91,40 89,87 93,28 91,78 0,0031 0,0030 
Employmenti 203,54** 48,70 225,43*** 77,43 0,0124*** 0,0058** 
 80,31 80,22 80,59 80,65 0,0028 0,0028 
WorkQi 1826,40*** 1630,85*** 1983,28*** 1792,03*** 0,0614*** 0,0528*** 
 276,78 266,36 268,38 258,76 0,0088 0,0083 
Specialisti 3392,56*** 3257,22***     
 54,86 55,65     
Ambulancei   2707,65*** 2437,87*** 0,1040*** 0,0918*** 
   198,31 204,63 0,0068 0,0071 
Anesthesiai   4156,41*** 4004,36*** 0,1450*** 0,1381*** 
   112,61 112,61 0,0035 0,0035 
Childreni   3245,56*** 3106,48*** 0,1179*** 0,1116*** 
   107,74 104,67 0,0036 0,0034 
Midwifei   3945,25*** 3822,57*** 0,1379*** 0,1324*** 
   97,92 99,93 0,0031 0,0031 
Districti   3175,06*** 3064,80*** 0,1135*** 0,1085*** 
   126,44 125,62 0,0038 0,0037 
Intensive carei   3937,16*** 3759,30*** 0,1390*** 0,1310*** 
   110,16 108,84 0,0035 0,0034 
Operationi   3722,16*** 3559,61*** 0,1309*** 0,1236*** 
   137,30 135,11 0,0044 0,0043 
Prychiatryi   2045,14*** 2031,94*** 0,0760*** 0,0754*** 
   138,51 130,76 0,0046 0,0042 
Other specialisti   3030,96*** 2918,74*** 0,1065*** 0,1015*** 
      90,76 89,60 0,0029 0,0029 
R
2
 66,46 67,66 67,50 68,59 69,53 71,35 
Adjusted R
2
 66,44 67,63 67,45 68,54 69,49 71,30 
F-stat. 3485,438*** 3065,77*** 1403,66*** 1370,53*** 1542,60*** 1562,81*** 
AIC 18,34 18,30 18,31 18,27 -2,28 -2,34 
BIC 18,34 18,31 18,32 18,29 -2,27 -2,33 
*=10% level of significance, **=5% level of significance and ***=1% level of significance.. 
General nurse is the baseline in all regressions. 
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both models the variable Sexi indicate that female nurses earn more than male nurses, but the 
variable does not significantly differ from zero and it is very low in its magnitude. The 
coefficient for the variable WorkQi should be multiplied by the share of full time employment 
a nurse works and it seems that the effect of working part time affect the wage level for a 
given quantity of work. The dummy variable for being permanently employed is significant 
on a five percent level in F1 but in F2 it is not significant on conventional levels. Its small 
positive coefficient indicates a small but positive effect on wages by being permanently 
employed. All other variables are significant on a level of one percent. The wage premium of 
getting specialized is on average around 3300 SEK per month before tax according to these 
two models.  
 
In order to fulfil the purpose of this thesis and to get models that fit better with the data, the 
models are extended to S1 and S2. It is then possible to state wage premiums for each kind of 
specialist nurse. In addition these models get an overall improvement. AIC and BIC get even 
lower and R
2 
and adjusted R
2
 get even higher. Again, it is concluded that the addition of a 
squared age variable improves the model and that there is a decreasing positive marginal 
effect of age on the wage level. Thus S2 is the preferred model so far. All variables differ 
significantly from zero on a one percent level in all cases but for Sexi in both models and 
Employmenti in S2. The variable Sexi in both models now indicate that female nurses earn 
less than male nurses but once again the variable is low in its magnitude and does not differ 
from zero on conventional levels of significance. It is in line with the conclusion by Calmfors 
& Rickardsson (2004) that women earn slightly less than men in the Swedish health sector but 
the difference is relatively small. The coefficients for the specialist nurse variables are of main 
interest for the purpose of this thesis. From the models one can observe a difference in wage 
premiums depending on which kind of specialist a nurse chooses to become. In S2, the lowest 
average wage premium belongs to a nurse specialized in psychiatry. It is estimated to an extra 
amount of 2 031.94 SEK per month before tax. Those specialized in anesthesia get the highest 
average wage premium. It is estimated to 4 004.36 SEK per month before tax. It is almost the 
double average wage premium even though their education is of equal length.  
 
The logarithmic models, log1 and log2, are the same models as S1 and S2 but with the wage 
of logarithmic character. In the logarithmic models R
2 
and adjusted R
2
 get even higher and the 
information criteria are negative. These models fit well with the data but it is hard to compare 
these models to the non-logarithmic models. The interpretations of the coefficients in the 
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logarithmic models are in relative terms. In able to answer the question of this thesis, absolute 
values are needed. Therefore the logarithmic models are not used when determining the 
economic incentives for a general nurse to get specialized. S2 is the preferred model when 
answering the questions in this thesis. Otherwise the implications of the log models are 
similar to S1 and S2. The only difference is that Empoyment i significantly differs from zero 
on a level of five percent in log2 while the same variable is not significant on conventional 
levels in S2. The best and worst paid specialist nurses are the same in the log models. A 
psychiatry nurse has an average wage premium of 7.54% compared to a general nurse while it 
is 13.81% on average for a nurse specialized in anesthesia.  
 
5.2 Economic Incentives 
 
In this section the magnitude of a general nurse’s economic incentives to get specialized in 
different areas are presented when taking both the costs and benefits into account. In Table 4 
and 5, the results of simple illustrative calculations are shown. Both tables exhibit economic 
outcomes for an average general nurse employed by Region Skåne to get specialized in 
certain areas. In Table 4, the monetary benefit and net benefit for an average general nurse 
until retirement is presented with different assumptions and discount rates chosen. In Table 5, 
the number of years for a specialist nurse education to break even is presented with the same 
assumptions made. In the sample an average general nurse is 39.51 years old, permanently 
employed, works 95.6% of full time employment and is a woman. For simplicity the 
calculations are performed on an average general nurse working full time. According to the 
model S2, the wage of an average general nurse is expected to be 26 213.56 SEK per month 
before tax.  
 
5.2.1 Calculations and assumptions 
 
The calculations in Table 4 are made according to Equation 7 below. Those made in Table 5 
are based on the same calculations and assumptions. It is then solved for the time it takes for 
the net benefit to be equal to zero, i.e. the time it takes for the investment to break even. The 
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variable Bt is the wage benefit by getting specialized estimated in S2. It is assumed to be 
constant over time in real terms. Thus future inflation can safely be ignored. It gets discounted 
at the interest rate of r and the time index indicates the time passed in years since the average 
nurse got specialized. If the average nurse gets specialized today, n is equal to 25.49 years. It 
is the remaining time until retirement. According to economic theory, future income should be 
discounted since individuals tend to value present income more than the same amount in the 
future. How valuable the future gain in income is differs across individuals and thus several 
interest rates are used. The variable C is the cost for the average nurse to get specialized 
today. It contains the loss in income as a general nurse during the studies and the needed loan. 
It is assumed that an individual only cares about the after tax income. Thus the tax is 
subtracted from both benefits and costs. The average tax rate in Sweden 2014 is 31.86% 
according the Swedish tax authority. 
 
Full time studies in Sweden last 40 weeks per year. Thus the loss in income the first year is 
based on the above mentioned wage after tax during 40 weeks. If the nurse becomes a 
midwife or a district nurse, the education continues the second year. In the second year the 
nurse is one year older and is expected to have a loss in income of 26 404.20 SEK before tax 
per month according to the model S2. For a district nurse the additional loss in income is 
during 10 weeks while it is additional 20 weeks for a midwife.  
 
It is assumed that the average general nurse finances its studies by the earlier mentioned loan 
from the Swedish National Board of Student Aid (CSN).  In 2014 the interest rate on such a 
loan is 1.2% on a yearly basis and thus it is expected not to grow in real terms over time. A 
Swedish student also gets a monthly transfer each month for studying. The loan minus the 
transfer is included in the cost and is 16 820 SEK per semester for a full time student. The 
loan plus the transfer is considered as very low income in Sweden. If the student has worked 
before studying, there is a possibility to get an additional loan of 17 580 SEK per semester for 
a full time student. Almost all nurses who choose to get specialized have worked for several 
years before starting their additional education. A general nurse has probably adapted his or 
her lifestyle in line with the present income and thus it is reasonable to assume that he or she 
would choose to get the additional loan in order to make a living. In the tables both the 
situation with the normal loan and the additional loan are presented. In Table 4, the normal 
loan situation is labeled as Net benefit 1 and the additional loan situation is labeled as Net  
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Table 4: Economic incentives for an average general nurse to get specialized 
 
 
 Wage benefit (SEK)    
 0% 1% 3% 5% 
Ambulance 508 116.82 446 569.09 351 676.46 283 729.47 
Anesthesia 834 615.06 733 518.88 577 651.55 466 044.18 
Children 647 473.79 569 045.87 448 127.83 361 545.59 
Midwife 796 725.39 700 218.76 551 427.45 444 886.81 
District 638 785.94 561 410.37 442 114.82 356 694.34 
Intensive Care 783 537.82 688 628.59 542 300.11 437 522.95 
Operation 741 918.15 652 050.27 513 494.41 414 282.76 
Psychiatry 423 509.37 372 210.06 293 118.18 236 485.16 
Other Specialist 608 343.15 534 655.09 421 044.84 339 695.26 
     
 Net benefit 1 (SEK)    
 0% 1% 3% 5% 
Ambulance 310 161.85 248 614.11 153 721.49 85 774.49 
Anesthesia 636 660.08 535 563.91 379 696.57 268 089.20 
Children 449 518.81 371 090.89 250 172.86 163 590.61 
Midwife 499 195.44 402 688.80 253 897.50 147 356.85 
District 391 043.48 313 667.91 194 372.36 108 951.88 
Intensive Care 585 582.85 490 673.61 344 345.13 239 567.97 
Operation 543 963.17 454 095.29 315 539.44 216 327.79 
Psychiatry 225 554.39 174 255.08 95 163.20 38 530.18 
Other Specialist 410 388.17 336 700.11 223 089.86 141 740.29 
     
 Net benefit 2 (SEK)    
 0% 1% 3% 5% 
Ambulance 275 001.85 213 454.11 118 561.49 50 614.49 
Anesthesia 601 500.08 500 403.91 344 536.57 232 929.20 
Children 414 358.81 335 930.89 215 012.86 128 430.61 
Midwife 446 455.44 349 948.80 201 157.50 94 616.85 
District 347 093.48 269 717.91 150 422.36 65 001.88 
Intensive Care 550 422.85 455 513.61 309 185.13 204 407.97 
Operation 508 803.17 418 935.29 280 379.44 181 167.79 
Psychiatry 190 394.39 139 095.08 60 003.20 3 370.18 
Other Specialist 375 228.17 301 540.11 187 929.86 106 580.29 
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Table 5: Number of years for a specialist nurse education to break-even economically 
 
 Normal loan (years)   With additional loan (years)  
 0% 1% 3% 5% 0% 1% 3% 5% 
Ambulance 9.93 10.51 11.97 14.06 11.69 12.50 14.62 18.01 
Anesthesia 6.05 6.27 6.77 7.38 7.12 7.42 8.13 9.02 
Children 7.79 8.15 9.01 10.12 9.18 9.67 10.89 12.59 
Midwife 9.52 10.05 11.38 13.24 11.21 11.94 13.86 16.84 
District 9.89 10.46 11.90 13.97 11.64 12.44 14.53 17.88 
Intensive Care 6.44 6.69 7.26 7.96 7.58 7.93 8.73 9.77 
Operation 6.80 7.08 7.72 8.52 8.01 8.39 9.30 10.49 
Psychiatry 11.91 12.75 14.96 18.56 14.03 15.19 18.48 24.78 
Other Specialist 8.29 8.70 9.68 10.98 9.77 10.33 11.73 13.74 
 
benefit 2. Under Wage benefit, no costs are subtracted. All values are in SEK at the Swedish 
price level of 2014. 
 
5.2.2 Net benefit of getting specialized 
 
In all cases shown in the tables there is no nurse specialist education that does not break even 
economically for an average general nurse in Region Skåne. In the case with additional loan 
and specializing in psychiatry it is very close that the investment does not break even with a 
chosen discount rate of five percent. The different discount rates are shown to have a large 
impact on the results. It is likely that nurses have different preferences and thus value their 
future income in different ways. A slightly higher discount rate than five percent would turn 
several educations to negative investments. How long it would take for the different 
educations to break even is shown in Table 5. It is shown that some educations would not 
break even for nurses older than the average general nurse in Region Skåne. However, it 
would be even more beneficial for younger nurses to specialize since they will benefit from 
the specialist nurse wage premium in more years and lose less in income during their studies 
on average. The results in both tables indicate a large difference between different specialist 
nurse educations. Specializing in anesthesia is the most beneficial education while the least 
beneficial is specializing in psychiatry. In all cases but one it takes at least twice the time for 
the decision to specialize in psychiatry to break even economically than specializing within 
anesthesia. For nurses specializing within anesthesia and intensive care it takes less than ten 
years for the education to break even economically in all cases. For midwives and nurses who 
choose to get specialized within ambulance or district nursing it takes at least ten years for the 
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education to break even in all cases but one. If the nurse chooses to specialize within 
psychiatry it is expected that it will take more than ten years for the education to break even in 
all cases. Nurse specialist educations within children and operation lie between those two 
groups. In the calculations it is assumed that the length of the education for other specialist 
nurses is one year. However, there are many kinds of specialist nurses labeled as other 
specialist nurse and thus the reliability of their result is lower than for the other groups.   
6. Discussion 
 
In this thesis it is stated that there is a shortage of both general and specialist nurses in 
Sweden. Their wage level is low and a large fraction of Swedish nurses are unsatisfied with 
their working conditions. The shortage is largest for specialist nurses and thus the focus in this 
thesis is how to reduce the shortage of this particular group. For several reasons it is important 
to reduce the shortage of specialist nurses. There are technological improvements in the health 
sector which increase the demand of specialized nurses. Like in most developed countries, 
there are demographic changes in Sweden with an increasing share of elderly in the 
population. It makes the demand for health care go up and thus also for nurses. In addition it 
is a group with a heavily increasing median age and thus the magnitude of the problem will 
probably increase in the near and distant future unless actions are taken by policy makers. It is 
concluded that the upcoming of this situation is due to a monopsonistic labor market for 
nurses. However, there are factors reducing monopsony power for nurses like increased 
competition between county councils and increased competition by the municipalities. It is 
argued that specialist nurses are more exposed to employers’ monopsony power than general 
nurses. Most specialist nurses are bound to work for the county council since it is the only 
provider of health care where certain types of specialist nurses are needed. Thus they have 
fewer potential employers than a general nurse. Furthermore it is concluded that nurses react 
to economic changes. However, a nurse’s utility is not only determined by economic factors 
but also factors like working conditions and possibilities of advancement.   
  
It cannot be proved that economic incentives are negative for an average general nurse 
employed by Region Skåne to get specialized in any area with the chosen discount rates. 
However, it does not mean that the economic incentives are positive either. It is argued that 
the nurses who choose to specialize have higher ability on average than nurses who do not 
choose to do so since they have higher marginal effects on utility when it comes to increasing 
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levels of skill and influence. In addition the disutility of the effort demanded is argued to be 
lower for individuals with higher ability. Because of higher ability they would most likely get 
better paid than other nurses even if they had chosen not to get specialized. It makes the 
regressions suffer from endogeneity and the estimated wage premiums for different specialist 
nurses are probably all overestimated. Without a measurement for ability it is hard to 
determine how large the differences between the estimates and the true causal wage premiums 
are. One can only say that the wage premiums are most likely lower than presented in the 
results. It might be the case that the level of ability differs between different specialist nurse 
groups too and thus the upward biasedness may differ between nurses specialized within 
different areas.  
 
The conclusion is that the estimated wage premiums in the regressions are for certain not 
higher than what is shown in the regressions. The same reasoning applies to the presented net 
benefits of nurse specialist educations. They are likely to be lower than shown in the results. 
The number of years it takes for a nurse specialist education to break even should be 
interpreted as the number of years it at least takes for the education to break even. It probably 
takes a longer time for all nurse specialist educations to break even economically than shown 
in the results. Thus a specialist nurse education might be a negative investment within some 
or all areas even though it cannot be shown in the results. In addition the indications that 
municipalities pay nurses more than county councils makes the incentives even lower for the 
nurses employed by a municipality to get specialized because the wage premium for those 
nurses would be even lower. At least within those areas presented in this thesis. It might also 
attract nurses to start working for a municipality instead of getting specialized. 
 
If the true economic effects are negative for an average general nurse to get specialized it 
might be the case that some nurses get a positive utility by doing so anyway due to the change 
in other variables like the level of skill and influence. However it is less likely than in the 
opposite case. For the same reason a nurse might not choose to get specialized even though 
the economic incentives are positive. Thus economic incentives can be too low despite the 
fact that they are positive. Thus, there is a need to complement this thesis by estimating 
general nurses’ reservation wage premium of getting specialized. Since there is a shortage of 
specialist nurses in Sweden and Skåne, economic incentives, the change in effort and the level 
of skill and influence for nurses when specializing are concluded not to cause a positive utility 
for enough nurses. Even though it cannot be shown in this thesis that the existing economic 
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incentives cause disutility for a nurse when getting specialized, ceteris paribus, raising 
specialist nurse wages is a policy that would reduce the shortage. Another policy implication 
is to reduce the costs for a nurse to get specialized by offering more paid specialist nurse 
educations than today. In addition higher economic incentives are argued to increase the 
productivity of nurses. Another possible problem might be that the wage level for general 
nurses is to low and thus too few nurses with the needed ability to get a positive utility of 
getting specialized are attracted in today’s situation. An additional policy implication is to 
increase the influence of specialist nurses. One such policy would be to let specialist nurses 
assist the physicians more than they today and/or to take over some tasks from the physician. 
In addition such a policy would reduce costs for the county councils since a specialist nurse 
costs less than a physician and the physician gain more time to perform other advanced 
treatments. 
 
The contribution of this thesis is the analysis of specialist nurses in Sweden. As far as I know 
there is no research regarding economic incentives for nurses to get specialized, nor has it 
been done any research regarding Swedish nurses alone. The results in this thesis are specific 
for the Skåne region in Sweden. There is high internal validity. The external validity is lower. 
There are some regional differences in Sweden, but the results and conclusion might to some 
extent be valid for the whole country. At least when it comes to the theoretical conclusions 
and those based on previous research. However, there is no reason to believe that the 
empirical results in this thesis are applicable in other countries. I urge future researchers to 
perform similar studies in Sweden for other county councils and/or for the whole country. It 
might be the case that negative incentives can be proved with a data material covering the 
whole country or other regions. In addition, it is important to include nurses working for 
municipalities and private actors in the analysis. In order to get the true causal wage effect for 
becoming different kinds of specialist nurses, a measurement for ability is to be preferred. In 
addition researchers should aim at trying to estimate general nurses’ reservation wage 
premium for getting specialized.  
7. Conclusions 
 
It is concluded that the utility of getting specialized is not positive for enough nurses and thus 
there is a shortage of specialist nurses in Skåne and Sweden. The main conclusion of this 
thesis is that it cannot be proved that economic incentives for an average nurse employed by 
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Region Skåne to get specialized do not exist. On the other hand it is concluded that it might 
still be the case that there are no economic incentives for an average nurse to get specialized, 
because the true causal effect of getting specialized is not estimated in the analysis. It is also 
argued that even if there are economic incentives to get specialized they might be too low. 
Raising the wage premiums would still be an effective way of attracting general nurses to 
specialize. Future researchers are urged to perform similar studies and to complement this 
study by adding measurements for ability and/or to reveal nurses’ reservation wage premiums. 
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